Preemptive strike: An experimental study of fear-based aggression  by Simunovic, Dora et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 1120–1123
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate / j espFlashReportPreemptive strike: An experimental study of fear-based aggressionDora Simunovic a, Nobuhiro Mifune b, Toshio Yamagishi c,⁎
a Department of Behavioral Science, Hokkaido University, N10 W7 Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan
b Nobuhiro Mifune, School of Management, Kochi University of Technology, Tosa Yamada Cho, Kami-shi, Kochi-ken 782-8502, Japan
c Center for Evolutionary Cognitive Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan
H I G H L I G H T S
• We found that 50% of the participants chose to use the preemptive attack option for no personal gain.
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SpiteThe mere presence of a potential threat of attack was found to be sufﬁcient to lead a signiﬁcant proportion of par-
ticipants to engage inpreemptive attacks towardpotential threats; this response occurred evenwithout an incentive
for either party to attack the other.We developed a newexperimental game—the preemptive strike game (PSG)—to
demonstrate this tendency for defensive aggression. We also found that the rate at which participants attacked an
individual representing a potential threat was not inﬂuenced by their minimal group membership; participants
were no less likely to preemptively attack a member of their ownminimal group and nomore likely to use aggres-
sion against members of another minimal group. These ﬁndings indicate a need to further examine the role
that fear-based defensive aggression, rather than anger-based spiteful aggression, plays in inter-individual and
inter-group conﬂict.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Following a 2002 speech at West Point, the administration of then-
President George W. Bush adopted a new emphasis on pre-emption in
their National Security Strategy, stating that “[t]he greater the threat,
the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves” (The White House,
2002). The Bush doctrine was implemented the following year when
the US invaded Iraq with the stated purpose of destroying the threat
of mass destruction posed by the latter. In the wake of 9/11, a substan-
tial majority of Americans supported this preemptive strike, despite the
lack of clear reasons for a potential attack on theUS (Eichenberg, Stoll, &
Lebo, 2006). In the current study, we examined how likely people are to
engage in this type of defensive aggression even in the absence of incen-
tives for either party to attack the other. For this purpose, we designed
the preemptive strike game (PSG), a two-person economic game innovic), n.mifune@gmail.com
.com (T. Yamagishi).
c. Open access under CC BY license.which neither player has an incentive to attack the other, insofar as
both players are rational and assume that the other is rational. In this
game, each player is given an option to press a button before the other
player presses it. Pressing the button involves some monetary cost.
The player who presses the button ﬁrst imposes monetary costs on
the opponent, which are greater than those incurred by the player
whopresses the button. The gist of this game is that a ﬁrst strike secures
a player from enduring further aggression from his/her opponent. Once
one of the players presses the button, the other player cannot retaliate
by pressing the button in response. Reasons for engaging in a preemp-
tive strike in this situation is a player's spiteful preference (Falk, Fehr,
& Fischbacher, 2005) or a belief that the other party is irrational, stupid,
confused, or has a spiteful preference (Andreoni, 1995; Schelling, 1980).
The primary goal of this study is to demonstrate that the mere pres-
ence of an interaction partner capable of attacking a given player is suf-
ﬁcient for the latter to engage in a preemptive attack. This goal was
achieved in Study 1, which demonstrated that a substantial proportion
of our participants engaged in a preemptive attack when their interac-
tion partner had the capability to attack them, while they did not do so
when their partner did not have such capability. The second goal of
this study was to examine whether this type of defensive aggression
would be aggravated in an inter-group situation, as opposed to a
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issue, we conducted a minimal group experiment in Study 2 to see if
group membership affected the frequency of the preemptive attack.
Previous research has found evidence that members of the in-group
show greater spite toward the out-group than the in-group (Bernhard,
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006); this has been observed even when the
groups were formed on the basis of meaningless criteria and without
any prior interaction or shared interests between the group members
(called minimal groups; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Given
the standard interpretation of in-group bias in minimal group experi-
ments, we expected relatively stronger spite-based behavior against
out-group members than in-group members. Furthermore, previous
research has found positive in-group bias and negative out-group bias
in the judgment of members' personal qualities (Brewer, 1979;
Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). It is likely that this bias reduces an
individual's anticipation of attack from in-group members and/or en-
hances fear of attack fromout-groupmembers, leading to the prediction
that defensive aggressionwould beweakerwhen the opponent is an in-
group member, rather than an out-group member.
An alternative interpretation of in-groupbias inminimal group exper-
iments from the interdependence theoretic perspective (Mifune,
Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008, 2009)
predicts no group difference in spite-based aggression against the out-
group. According to the proponents of the interdependence theoretic
perspective, in-group bias represents a means of enhancing the player's
reputation as a person deserving favors from members of his/her group.
Yamagishi and colleagues (e.g., Horita & Yamagishi, 2010; Jin &
Yamagishi, 1997; Kiyonari, 2002; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008, 2009)
conducted a series of experiments in which participants behaved more
cooperatively or altruistically toward in-group members than out-
group members when, and only when, they were identiﬁed by in-
groupmembers asmembers of the same group. In contrast, no group dif-
ference was observed when participants knew that their partners were
in-group members who were, however, unaware of the participant's
membership. These ﬁndings have been interpreted to show that stronger
spite against the out-group is not the main motivational basis for the in-
group bias observed in minimal group studies; rather, inter-group ag-
gression is considered a by-product of in-group cooperation particularly
in situations in which the latter requires negative side effects for the
out-group (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008). Since the PSG involves no
in-group cooperation, there is no reason for participants to act in a man-
ner that favors the in-group. This is also true for members of the out-
group; thus, there is no reason to be afraid of an attack occurring as a re-
sult of in-group cooperation among members of the out-group. On this
basis, there could be no fear-based in-group bias too. We tested the two
alternative hypotheses mentioned above by using the PSG in which par-
ticipants faced an in-group or out-group opponent.
Study 1: Bilateral and unilateral preemptive strike games
In the PSG used in our study, participants chose between two options:
1) press a red button displayed on the computer screens, or 2) take no ac-
tion. Their decisionsweremade in real time andonlyonce. If neitherplayer
pressed the red button during the allotted time (60 s), they both walked
away with the highest possible payoff, JPY 1500. If one of the players
pressed the button, he/she paid JPY 100, while the other player paid an
even higher amount, JPY 1000, and lost his/her ability to press the button.
Insofar as the players in this game are rational maximizers of their
own money, the only motive to press the button is self-defense against
a potential threat of aggression from the opponent. However, it is possible
for the players to be motivated by spite. In other words, participants may
press the button to ensure their dominance over another person by
harming the other player's relative standing in the game. In Study 1, we
compared a unilateral condition of the PSG to the original (bilateral)
game to demonstrate that the attacks occurring in the PSG were not mo-
tivated by spite. In the unilateral condition, the red button was presentedto only one of the twoplayers, leaving the other playerwithout the option
to press the button. Thismanipulation rids the “powerful player” of a rea-
son to anticipate an aggressive action from his/her opponent and, as a re-
sult, provides no reason for this player to act out of self-defense.
Procedure
Participants
Eighty-four students from Hokkaido University (34 female) partici-
pated in 16 experimental sessions, with eight participants per session.
Thirty-two participants (13 female) took part in the bilateral PSG; 26
of these (11 female) took on the role of the decider, who was provided
with the red button in the unilateral PSG, and 26 participants (10 fe-
male) took on the role of the predictor, who did not have any button
and simply predicted the decider's choice. The predictors' data from
the unilateral condition were not used for analysis. Because the nature
of the experiment required an even number of participants, a confeder-
ate was used in cases of cancelation. The confederate's choice in the bi-
lateral condition did not affect thematched participant's choice because
his/her decisions were not revealed until the end of the game. The con-
federates were assigned the role of predictor in the unilateral condition.
PSG
The participant faced a computer surrounded by partitions that
prevented others in the room from seeing him/her. Participants were
told that they would be randomly paired with one other person from
the room, who would remain unknown to them. The instructions also
stated that the game would be played only once. After the participants
completed a practice session following the instructions, the experi-
menter announced the beginning of the game. Participants were given
a 5-second countdown before the 60-second game began. Feedback
about the outcome of the game was given after expiry of the allocated
time.We analyzed whether each participant pressed the red button, re-
gardless of whether he/she did so before his/her partner did. In the case
of both players pressing the button, payment was decided on the basis
of who pressed the button ﬁrst.
Hypothetical PSG
After completing the game, participants took part in an additional
hypothetical experiment in which they were told to imagine a situation
where they faced the same game. They were further informed that they
would have an additional “blue” button. They could press the red but-
ton, the blue button, or neither. Pressing the red button had the same ef-
fect as in the real experiment. Pressing the blue button reduced both
players' respective rewards by JPY 100 and disabled further attacks,
without imposing the loss of JPY 1000 on the other player. If players
only sought to defend themselves against a possible attack, they
would opt for pressing the blue button.
Results
PSG
In the bilateral condition, 16 of the 32 participants (50%) pressed the
red button, while only 1 of the 26 participants acting as deciders in the
unilateral condition did so (Fig. 1). The difference between the condi-
tions was statistically signiﬁcant (χ2[1, N = 58] = 14.57, p b .01). All
of the participants who pressed the red button in the bilateral condition
did sowithin the ﬁrst second of the game. This ﬁnding suggests that the
participants who pressed the button did so with a clear understanding
of the implications of their actions, as it would be logical to press the
red button as quickly as possible. The sole attacker in the unilateral con-
dition pressed the button 53.8 s into the game.
Hypothetical PSG
The results of the hypothetical experiment conﬁrmed that the
overwhelming majority of the participants who pressed the button
Fig. 1. The number of participants (by condition)who attacked or did not attack in Study 1
(left), and the number of decisions to press the red or blue button, or neither, in the hypo-
thetical experiment in Study 1 (right).
Fig. 2. The number of participants (by group condition) who attacked or did not attack in
Study 2 (left), and the number of decisions to press the red or blue button, or neither, in
the hypothetical experiment in Study 2 (right).
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13 of the 16 attackers opted to press the blue button rather than the red
button, while 2 opted to press neither button, and only 1 pressed the
red button. Four of the sixteen non-attackers opted to press the blue but-
ton, and none of themopted to press the red button. These results suggest
that only one participant in the real experiment pressed the red button
out of spite, whereas the others did so as a means of self-defense.
Study 2: Minimal groups
We followed up Study 1 with a PSG in which participants were
assigned to minimal groups.
Procedure
A total of 132 students took part in 14 experimental sessions, with 6
to 10 participants per session. Theywere ﬁrst asked to participate in the
picture preference task. They were shown 28 pairs of pictures by either
Paul Klee orWassily Kandinsky and asked to choose which picture they
liked more in each pair. Participants were then assigned either to the
Klee group or the Kandinsky group on the basis of their preferences
for the two artists, and subsequently answered identity scales assessing
the strength of in-group and out-group identiﬁcation (Grieve & Hogg,
1999). They were then randomly assigned to either the in-group condi-
tion or the out-group condition, and played the PSG either with amem-
ber of the same group or the other group. As in Study 1, participants
took part in an additional hypothetical experiment with the option of
a blue button. A confederate was used in the case of a cancelation.
Results
Manipulation check
Participants' mean level of identiﬁcation with the in-group (M =
4.28, SD = 1.16) was signiﬁcantly stronger than that with the out-
group (M = 4.07, SD = 1.03; t(131) = 2.43, p b .05). This result
conﬁrms that our minimal group manipulation was effective.
PSG
Of the 132 participants, 40 (30.3%) pressed the red button; therewas
no signiﬁcant difference between the in-group and the out-group con-
ditions (χ2[1, N = 132] = .18, p = .67), with 29% of the 73 partici-
pants in the in-group condition and 32% of the 59 participants in the
out-group condition pressing the red button (Fig. 2). Of the 40 attackers,37 did so within the ﬁrst second of the game; an additional three
attacked at 1.3, 2.1, and 4.7 s, respectively.
Hypothetical PSG
The results of the hypothetical experiment conﬁrmed that the over-
whelming majority of the attackers in the real experiment opted to
press either the blue button (76% of the attackers in the in-group condi-
tion, 68% in the out-group condition) or neither button (14% in the in-
group condition, 21% in the out-group condition). Only 2 of the 21
attackers in the in-group condition and 2 of the 19 attackers in the
out-group condition pressed the red button. None of the non-attackers
pressed the red button (Fig. 2).
Overall discussion
Intergroup aggression has traditionally been treated as a form of af-
fective or predatory aggression, but defensive aggression, such as the
preemptive attack in the current PSG study, does not fully correspond
with either type of aggression (Berkowitz, 1993; McElliskem, 2004).
The overwhelming majority of participants who acted aggressively
(i.e., imposed harm on the other participant) in the current study did
not desire to harm the opponent, as shown by the fact that most of
themopted for themore benign blue buttonwhen this optionwas avail-
able. The act of a preemptive strikewas thus found to be ameans of self-
defense, based on the fear of being attacked ﬁrst. While fear has been
traditionally linked to ﬂight rather than ﬁght (cf., Cannon, 1932), the
ﬁnding that approximately half of the participants engaged in the pre-
emptive strike option for no personal gain highlights the role that the
“benign,” defensive form of aggression plays in inter-individual and
inter-group conﬂict. In fact, defensive aggression can produce conse-
quences as serious as those triggered by spiteful aggression, as exempli-
ﬁed by the role played by the support for the Bush Doctrine in swaying
Americans toward supporting the Iraq War.
Although the current study found no group difference in defensive
aggression insofar as minimal groups are concerned, the role of fear in
instigating intergroup aggression has been demonstrated in earlier
studies (Bar-Tal, 2001; De Dreu et al., 2010). Furthermore, it has been
noted that the role played by fear, in addition to greed, in inter-group
conﬂict is stronger in group-level decisions, as compared to individual
decisions (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990; Schopler
et al., 1993; see Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003, for a
review). This suggests that the fear of being attacked by an opponent
could be stronger when the opponent is a group, rather than an
1123D. Simunovic et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 1120–1123individual. Thus, it is possible that the preemptive strike in the PSG oc-
curs more frequently in a group-level decision than in an individual de-
cision. The absence of group bias in our study could be due to the fact
that we studied the effect at the individual level, or that the PSG was
played in a negative domain where in-group bias is known to be rare
(Brewer, 1979; Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Therefore, in the future,
it is important to study whether preemptive attacks against the out-
group increase when the decision is made by the group, rather than
the individual. The ﬁndings from the current study will serve as a base-
line for evaluating the possible roles of additional factors, including the
individual–group discontinuity effect, in future research.
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